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I. Introduction
————————————————————————————————————
Over my years at Macalester, my study of legal scholarship presented me with a
dilemma that I had not found solution for: the law is limited by its foundation of
categories. In my first Constitutional Law class, we studied cases organized thematically
by what right it was argued under. The first amendment had its case law, then the second
amendment, and so on and so on until we had covered the entire Bill of Rights. In all of
these discussions and doctrine, it was clear that the tests and rationale the Justices created
were open to interpretation and debate. This is what makes the study of Constitutional
Law so interesting to me. Every doctrine has a utility depending on who it is protecting,
and it can be manipulated to serve an ends if interpreted favorably. Yet, what
dumbfounded me the most was the utility of the privacy doctrine in the abortion case law.
After taking women’s biology, it seemed clear that the right to control ones reproductive
life is an essential equality issue, not one of privacy. But where was this legal
interpretation?
When Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) brought marriage equality under equal
protection, I found myself questioning the utility of the privacy doctrine again as
reproductive rights was under constant attack and gay rights succeeded in its legal battle.
My intrigue was deepened after Harvard history professor, Jill Lepore, wrote a op-ed on
the comparison between reproductive rights and marriage equality. She presented her
readers with a tentative conclusion: “Over time, arguments based on a right to privacy
have tended to weaken and crack; arguments based on equality have grown only
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stronger.”1 In my mind, this critique was compounded with Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s recent
dissent record and her open critique towards Roe’s utility of the privacy doctrine as well.
Lepore’s comparison seemed astute to me as her use of a case study was a way to
overcome the narrow scope legal analysis is usually limited to. The static nature of law
seemed to fall short of representing women’s issues adequately. Thus, using the success
of marriage equality as a background to the contrasting story of privacy and reproductive
rights was a useful analysis to gain insight into the legal doctrine developed thus far in
the Court. To begin, I wanted to understand the influence of these two movements and
their legal interpretations. Specifically, I wanted to gain insight into what legal
interpretation and rhetoric would best serve the reproductive rights movement going
forward.
The significance of this project comes through on both a material and theoretical
level. In practice, a deeper understanding of the rhetoric used within the Court can inform
how advocates outside the Court can curtail language to their advantage to progressively
get across their argument. For example, the current “Host” bill introduced in Oklahoma
would require a women to obtain consent from her sexual partner to get an abortion.2
While this is a clear violation of the constitutional right to abortion established in Roe and
solidified in Casey, the conversation within the state legislature centers around the
woman’s body as a “host” of the fetus and the argument for male control over her
reproductive capabilities. In response to the bill’s introduction, reproductive rights
1

Lepore, Jill. “To Have and to Hold”. The New Yorker, 25 May. 2015, pp. 117.

2

Oklahoma House Bill 1549
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advocate Amanda Allen responded to the bills unconstitutionality by claiming that this is
“a fruitless effort to shame and stigmatize women who are seeking abortion care and it is
completely and unequivocally unconstitutional.”3 While Allen directs her response
towards the obvious break in precedent in the Host bill, she does not respond to the
deeper issue at play within this rhetoric—the autonomy of women over their bodies. In
order to take reproductive rights off the defensive strategy and more towards making
proactive change for women, it’s important to understand the legal doctrine and inherent
rhetoric available to litigants.
The recent reproductive rights cases of Hobby Lobby (2014) and Whole Women’s
Health (2016) provide more material that had not been analyzed with the same lens as
Lepore introduced in her analysis. Additionally, the 2016 election made defunding
Planned Parenthood a wedge issue, heightening the risk of dismantling the right to an
abortion in America. On a theoretical level, the increased concentration on identity
politics within feminist theory has pushed the discipline as a whole to utilize more
intersectional analysis, and subsequently there had been a drop-off in legal interpretation.
This is because many feminists believe that law is not the best platform to discuss
intersectional identities and can actually be a hindrance for robust advocacy.4 Thus, my
perspective of feminist legal theory is less explored and lends opportunity for insight into
the advocacy of the reproductive rights movement.

Smith, Jordan. "Oklahoma Lawmakers Want Men to Approve All Abortions." The Intercept.
N.p., 13 Feb. 2017. Web. 25 Mar. 2017.
3

Dean Spade, "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society 38, no. 4 (Summer 2013): 1031-1055.
4
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In this thesis, I investigate, what is the constitutional basis for women’s equality?
To do this, I begin with Jill Lepore’s contribution and argument for the switch to equality
doctrine from a privacy legal basis for abortion cases. A major part of my project is
exploring the feminist criticisms behind both a privacy and equality argument to come to
my own conclusion into what I believe the best way forward is. My initial intentions was
to gather more in depth support for the switch to an equality argument for reproductive
rights. However, my investigation into the specific ways equality doctrine has been
applied to cases dealing with female autonomy showed me a much narrower concept of
equality the Court draws on. If not careful, equality doctrine can be used as a way to
perpetuate very traditional and limiting logic for female bodies and their autonomy. I will
leave this research with a much more tenuous and nuanced suggestion towards utilizing
arguments based in equality for reproductive rights. I contribute to this work by focusing
on how privacy and equality legal doctrine has specifically informed women’s autonomy
through the arguments litigants use, and the interpretations Justices make based on these
rights. I provide a analysis that highlights the draw backs and benefits of both privacy and
equality for a reproductive rights movement that is focused on advancing female
autonomy. Using a combination of liberal and legal feminist theory, I wish to find hope in
the synergy between equality and privacy frameworks that if used together, can give way
to a robust concept of female autonomy that will advance the feminist goal of articulating
what gender equality requires in a patriarchy.
I will begin by recounting the rise of the equal protection clause for women
through gender discrimination case law. To begin the first chapter, I will provide a
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theoretical background of equality to illustrate the feminist interpretation that I focus on
for this thesis. The history of gender discrimination jurisprudence will bring us to the
exclusion of reproductive rights within a equality argument category and the subsequent
use of a privacy argument instead. Chapter two will focus on the right to privacy and
reproductive rights case law. I will lay out how equal protection was not explicitly
utilized in reproductive rights case law, but came up in litigants arguments in several
cases. I will discuss the re-emergence of equality arguments within this privacy
framework showcase the merits of an equality argument for the social movement in order
to convey why critiques of the privacy argument have driven scholars such as Lepore to
advocate for equality instead. In the third chapter, I will turn to the challenges and
limitations of both the privacy and equality argument by describing the lessons we can
take away from marriage equality. Finally, I will end with my suggestions for the road
ahead.

9

Chapter 1

A. Theoretical Background: Privacy and Equality
————————————————————————————————————
If you had to choose between your privacy or your equality, which would you
pick? It’s an impossible question to answer, but to understand why it must be posed in the
debate surrounding reproductive rights in America, it is important to critique the feminist
utility of the concept of privacy and equality in law. This is what I strive to do through a
case history of reproductive rights, gender discrimination, and marriage equality. Inherent
in all of these social movements is a debate on morality, oppressive patriarchal structures,
assimilation, and the consequences of an American liberal tradition embedded in the
concepts of both equality and privacy. To begin, I will recount the origins of equality in
general and how it is understood in our legal structure. I will then describe feminist
positions and where I stand in the feminist interpretation of the equality and privacy
doctrine.
Equality has a strained history in American Law. This is not surprising, as one
prominent equality theorist, Ronald Dworkin, has described equality as a highly
contested, theoretical, and unavoidable concept: “People who praise it or disparage it
disagree about what they are praising or disparaging.”5 People who value equality,
egalitarians, might share their esteem for the concept for a variety of reasons. Some
theories assume the innate good in equality, some see it as a means for other forms of
5

Dworkin, Ronald, 2000, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
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justice, and others conversely do not treat equality in society as a unconditional good.
Non-egalitarians are skeptical of a system that may justify lowering the overall worth of
society to make everyone the same. While all of these branches of philosophy are highly
theoretical, their discourse illustrates that when someone conceptualizes “equality”, many
value assumptions must go into whatever form of equality they are advocating for.
Historians have conceded that there is no singular ideal for equality that is accepted.6
However, the blueprint for equality in an American context traces to philosophers like
Aristotle, Hobbes, and Locke.7 Equality theory has a prominent place in the American
political and legal system.
For founding fathers Hobbes and Locke, any political system needs equality to
ensure fair competition among political actors. They believed that men were the political
actors, and their masculinity was inherently violent and in search of glory. If this “state of
nature” was left unchecked, political society would end in destruction. The solution was a
social contract that would bind men together with reciprocity. The social contract needed
a leader to maintain the legitimacy and enforcement of the social contract. After a leader
was established, the social contract required men to respect the boundaries of their
property and put limitations on masculine violence. Included in the right to property was
the right to control women and divide them among the households. This paternal social
order made every male citizen like a king in his own household, responsible for its well
being and secured that others would not try to destroy it. The social contract was based on
6

Rae, Douglas, et al., 1981, Equalities, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

7

Gosepath, Stefan, "Equality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/>.
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a mutual equality that made the agreement reciprocal, it was paternal (the power stemmed
from the male), and it was based on property rights and voting rights that were
determined by race, gender, and class.8 The social contract thus placed a certain value on
equality in-so-far that the contract could remain reciprocal only with equal players in the
political system. The equality stemmed from equal opportunity to own property and
participate in the civil sphere.
If the political system rests on a promise of equality, then the law must protect it.
At its minimum, equal respect recognizes the equal worth or dignity of all humans and
“any political theory abandoning this notion of equality will not be found plausible
today.”9 The field of philosophy has come to understand legal equality as a “strict
equality” in that
“from the principle of formal equality, all citizens of a society must have equal
general rights and duties. These rights and duties have to be grounded in general
laws applying to everyone…. every person should have the same freedom to
structure his or her life, in the most far-reaching manner possible and in a
peaceful and appropriate social order.” 10
This concept of equality can be traced to Aristotle and has been adopted in the American
political system. Here, equality calls for two premises. One, people must have autonomy
or “freedom to structure his or her life.” Relevant to my research, it is important to note
8

Hobbes, Thomas, 1651, Leviathan, With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, ed.
by Edwin Curley, Indianapolis: Hackett 1994.; Pateman, Carole (1988). The Sexual Contract.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gosepath, Stefan, "Equality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/>.;
Vlastos, Gregory, 1962, “Justice and Equality”, in: R. Brandt (ed.), Social Justice, Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall; reprinted in: J. Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights, Oxford: Oxford University
Press 1984, pp. 41-76; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), Equality. Selected
Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997, pp. 120-133.
9
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how the concepts of equality, privacy and autonomy have been connected and
interdependent on each other, even from the start of their philosophical roots. Second,
the law must treat people the same, or deliver formal equality. To have formal equality is
to have leveled subjectivity. For this ideal, you must treat similar cases alike and different
cases differently in proportion to their differences.11 This concept makes sense in terms of
the American legal system. Equal protection law accounts for the normative and societal
discrimination protected classes face that effects their equal treatment. If a law treats
someone differently because of their protected class, there must be a compelling state
interest.
Criticism of the liberal interpretation and usefulness of equality has been present
in discourses along race, class, and able lines. The Civil Rights movement, Affirmative
Action, and disability law all asked if equal opportunity is enough. More has been
demanded of the law to try and undue the coded hierarchies many identities live in
everyday. Simple opportunity only hides the institutional barriers that work against any
protected class in American society. The law has been persuaded to give up the liberal
ideal and give way to a positive rights approach. The New Deal era and the start of an
American Welfare State changed the way the state is expected to take care of their
citizens. Sometimes the state must give resources to citizens to make up for the
disadvantage they face due to their identity. Inherent to this is, of course, more criticism
11

Gosepath, Stefan, "Equality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/>.;
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The complete works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.’ Baehr, Amy R., "Liberal Feminism", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/feminism-liberal/>.
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of the ways the state can curtail its programs to perpetuate the status quo while managing
to still seem paternalistic.

B. Feminist Liberal and Legal Theory
————————————————————————————————————
Liberal feminists value procedural equality and seek to treat similar cases alike
and different cases differently in proportion to their differences, but there is still
disagreement about what this means.12 Feminist scholars may disagree about how to best
achieve gender equality, but much of the discourse focuses on how to account for
differences in the most genuine way, without backlash, isolation, or compromising the
goal of equality. 13 Here, we see how many feminists agree that they want gender equality,
but often refer to many different concepts or methods of achieving this. Thus, there are
many branches of feminism, some in stark disagreement. Often a real world example to
illustrate the theoretical variety of feminism is the discourse surrounding prostitution.
While some feminists view prostitution as rape due to the economic disempowerment of
women that limits their ability to make free choice and thus advocate for the complete
elimination of sex work, while other branches view sex work as a breakaway from the
sexual subordination of women and wish to make sex work safer for females who utilize

Baehr, Amy R., "Liberal Feminism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/
feminism-liberal/>.
12
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Baehr, Amy R. (2013), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2013/entries/feminism-liberal/>.; Rhode, Deborah (1997). Speaking of Sex: The Denial of
Gender Inequality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.; Minow, Martha (1990). Making All the
Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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agency to choose this employment.14 These groups of two feminists may completely
disagree on every step in their analysis of position law, but all would say that gender
equality is the goal behind their method. 15
One strain of feminist theory dealing directly with equality and privacy revolves
around how the dichotomy of public/private and equality/difference exists in a patriarchal
social order and works to limit female autonomy. Political theorists such as Carole
Pateman have criticized the American Liberal tradition for relying on the subordination of
women through what Pateman calls the “sexual contract.” In order for the liberal ideal to
permeate though the consciousness of society, there must be a threat of disorder. Political
subjects agree to give up power to a leader with the promise that their property and
liberty within their private life will be protected. In this context, liberty is the restraint of
the state to interfere in private ownership and thus control over the property political
across have. Pateman claims that women are included within the property men have and
their presence is only valuable in so far as it serves the man. Thus, there is a necessary
dichotomy between the public and private. Pateman claims that the maintenance of a
public/private boundary sphere ideology needs the feminine to be subordinate to the
masculine and tied to the private sphere. Female autonomy is very limited as a result of
this construction. The social contract in a patriarchy requires the limited mobility of
femininity (women) between the two spheres and the maintenance of masculinity (men)
Shrage, Laurie, "Feminist Perspectives on Sex Markets,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2016/entries/feminist-sex-markets/>.; MacKinnon, C. and A. Dworkin (eds.), 1997,
In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
14
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https://aljahom.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/image48.png

15

in both. Without this tension, there would be no masculine anxiety to protect ownership
over property and thus the need for a leader.
Scholarship spearheaded by Wendy Brown has taken this argument a step further
to show that this dichotomy is maintained not only through marriage or explicit contracts
that subordinate the feminine, but through rights discourse itself. 16 Brown argues that
“the legacy of gender subordination Pateman identified as historically installed in the
sexual-contract is to be found not in contemporary contract relations but in the terms of
liberal discourse that configure and organize liberal jurisprudence, public policy, and
popular consciousness”.17 Thus, Brown expands the maintenance of the patriarchy to
reside not only in contractual relations, but in liberal discourse itself, particularly, in the
discourse surrounding both privacy and equality. While Brown has illustrated that the law
is one place that maintains a discourse of exclusion of women through liberal values such
as privacy and equality, a solution using a feminist method has still not been identified.
I wish to focus on one “ongoing area of theoretical exploration among feminists,”
namely “the weight and scope to be given to any distinction between the public and the
private in reproduction, family structures, work arrangements, and sexual
relationships…”18 that has been debated and analyzed through multiple feminist
perspectives. Here, I have identified a collision between liberal feminism and feminist

16

Brown, Wendy. "Liberalism’s Family Values." States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late
Modernity (1995): 135-165.
17

Brown, Wendy (1995)

18

Baehr, Amy R., "Liberal Feminism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013
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legal theory, both of which provide an extremely useful perspective on the American
legal system. As stated above, liberal feminism values procedural equality, yet has no
consensus on how to best achieve this ideal. Feminist legal theory critiques the law’s
ability to legitimize the status quo and represent interpretations as objective. A major
point of debate within the discipline is the interpretation and value judgment given to
“sexual difference.” Feminists agree that the gender difference is a women’s ability to
give birth, yet there is disagreement over how this should be accounted for in our laws.
Should the law treat men and women the same, or account for the differences between
them? Sexual difference is a convoluted concept within legal analysis since feminist legal
scholars agree that “law makes systemic bias invisible, normal, entrenched and thus
difficult to identify and oppose.” The subordination of women is maintained by an
unquestioning of what the private sphere is, and the states refrain from interfering.19
Legal feminist analysis demands the scrutiny of laws that identifies bias towards this
oppressive way of thinking whenever is occurs in the legal system.20 Feminist legal
theory is thus the practice of articulating what equality requires in a patriarchy. Liberal
feminist theory holds that autonomy is a pre-condition for equality, where autonomy for
women means the ability to move between the private and public just as freely as men.
This would mean no barriers or assumed positionally of women or men in either domain.
This is part of the feminist agenda, and will start with the dismantling of the assumption

19

Pateman, Carole. “Sexual Contract.” John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2014.

20

MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.” Harvard University Press,
1989.
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that the feminine belongs in a subordinate and privatized position to the masculine in a
public/private dichotomy in the American liberal tradition.
Feminist liberal critiques generally argue that autonomy for women is limited by
the inherited gendered institutions and traditions we live in that make it much more
challenging for women to authentically author her own life.21 It follows that in a liberal
political system, it is the state’s duty to provide a foundation of autonomy that goes
beyond the protection of the male subject in a gendered system and to protect the
female’s autonomy as well. Feminist legal theory uncovers the assumption that the
neutral subject in law is male, consequently the reproductive abilities of women is what
constitutes gender “difference.”22 Given these many layers of assumed bias against
women, there is yet no distinct concept of privacy for women that informs their
autonomy. I believe this female autonomy that should be protected differently than male
autonomy due to women’s ability to become pregnant and have children. The state should
have a different interpretation of privacy to ensure protection of autonomy. So far, case
law has recognized that a women’s autonomy and equality is connected to her ability to
control her reproductive life.23 Much like feminist theory does not have a clear answer on
how to guarantee female autonomy, legal doctrine lacks a robust answer to this question

21

Stein, Laura. “Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of
Privacy and Equality." Minnesota Law Review 77.1153 (1993): n. pag. LexisNexis. Web. 1 Mar.
2017.
MacKinnon, Catharine A. “Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.” Harvard University Press,
1989.
22

23

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)

18

as well. Some scholars argue that the courts cannot account for intersectional issues and
thus is not the proper place to theorize female autonomy.24
The push for identity politics has taken over much of feminist theory, yet I wish to
refocus on the role of the Courts and jurisprudence’s ability to inform and perpetuate the
discourse of social movements. 25 The abortion debate has traditionally focused on the
ability of women to access abortion, it is extremely important to recognize that this
rhetoric is not representative of all women’s denial of reproductive justice. A more
inclusive representation of women’s experiences in the abortion debate should entail
intersectional issues to constitute a more nuanced understanding of women’s limited
autonomy over their reproductive lives. For some, this may mean limited abortion access
while for other it may mean forced sterilization.26 The important take away is that the
reproductive justice movement is a social movement that has informed the legal rhetoric
surrounding women’s equality, and thus influences how we construct and treat women’s
position in society. Understanding the limitations of any one thread of change, I wish to
investigate the feminist utility of the privacy and equality doctrine through a case study of
mainly reproductive rights.
The reproductive rights of women is encompassed in a protection of privacy the
state must ensure. While the Court may have interpreted this to mean that laws cannot

24

Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color." Stanford law review (1991): 1241-1299.
Brown, Wendy. "Liberalism’s Family Values." States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late
Modernity (1995): 135-165.
25

Dean Spade, "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society 38, no. 4 (Summer 2013): 1031-1055.
26
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restrict abortion if there is a undue burden on the women’s right to an abortion, this
variety of feminist analysis goes deeper. Women should be “free of the limits set by
patriarchal paternalistic and moralistic laws: Patriarchal paternalistic laws restrict
women's options on the grounds that such limits are in women's interest.”27 In the
abortion debate, female autonomy is tied to an ideal of the feminine being privatized and
to the continuation of motherhood for women who can assimilate to the private/public
dichotomy. This concept of autonomy can be contrasted with the feminist interpretation
of female autonomy that “can never be separated from an affirmative relationship to our
‘flesh.’”28 Feminists painfully recognize that the ability to give birth constitutes the
“gender difference” that the law has traditionally used as the basis for female
subordination.29 Some feminists have wanted to deal with this difference by showing that
women are just like men and should be treated just like them. Yet, others note that women
are just as good as men men, and women can give birth.30
MacKinnon began the quest for a Feminist State by uncovering the harmful
effects of law’s neutrality. She strove to uncover the harmful discourse law perpetrates
surrounding the private/public dichotomy that informs women’s limited autonomy.
Scholars such as Drucilla Cornell have expanded on this work to show the usefulness of a

27Baehr, Amy

R., "Liberal Feminism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/
feminism-liberal/>.
28
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Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State." (1991): 2251.
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“equivalent rights” framework. Cornell articulates that equivalent rights “do not repeat
the ‘separate but equal’ argument” and are “valuable to feminists precisely because it
allows for a ‘positive’ program to guarantee women’s equality of well-being and
capability.”31 The concepts of negative and positive rights have been utilized by feminist
legal analysis and provide a useful framework for the feminist agenda.

C. Positive and Negative Rights
————————————————————————————————————
The Bill of Rights is written as negative rights: the state will not infringe on the
freedom of citizens. However, these same rights can be understood in a positive
interpretation. For example, feminists have discussed the possible use of a positive
interpretation of a right to privacy. For abortion, this would mean that the state has a
obligation to fund abortions, not just agree to not infringe on a woman’s access to
services.32 Negative rights is a refrain from government interference, while a positive
right is an affirmative protection. Both the equality and privacy doctrine have these
elements within their jurisprudence. For equality, treating men and women similarly
would be a negative interpretation of a right to equality, since it demands less from the
state. A positive approach would be to demand services such as maternity leave,
childcare, abortion services, etc. to make up for the gender difference that inhibit women

Cornell, Drucilla, and Catharine A. MacKinnon. "Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and
Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State." (1991): 2251.
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to participate fully in the civic sphere. Privacy is inherently a negative right that
embodies the private/public dichotomy that works to subordinate the feminine into the
private sphere. Yet, feminists have argued that its positive interpretation “would authorize
the government not simply to refrain from interfering with personhood, but also to act
when action is required to ensure personhood.”33 I draw on this concept to showcase the
strengths and limitations of both the equality and privacy doctrine though a positive and
negative rights framework.
In conclusion, feminist critique of concepts such as privacy and equality add
nuance to our understanding of how doctrines work to subordinate women in a variety of
ways. The upholding of a private/public dichotomy is essential for a patriarchy in a
liberal political tradition. It operates by limiting women to the private sphere to sustain a
male norm in civic life. On a rights level, this limits the equality of women because it
robs them of their autonomy. Philosophically, autonomy is tied to both notions of equality
and privacy, yet there is no explicit “right to” autonomy in our constitution. However, we
do know that as a consequence of the public/private tension, female autonomy is
understood and treated very differently than male autonomy. Currently, male autonomy
allows men to move more freely between civic and public life, while women are confined
to sustaining ideals of home life and motherhood. I will now turn to history to showcase
how early feminist theory handled severe limitations of women in the civic sphere.
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Chapter 2: Equality As Sameness: Gender Discrimination Case Law
————————————————————————————————————
The American constitution guarantees equal protection under the law. In the
modern understanding, this means that laws cannot treat an individual differently or deny
them protection because of their race, gender, or sexuality, absent sufficient justification.
But this was not always the case, and the ideal is not that simple to apply. Each of the
categories of discrimination has a case history in which it had to be established that
differential treatment of a group because of their race, gender, or sexual orientation must
survive heightened scrutiny to further a state interest. In this analysis, these categories
receive particular protection under the law.
An examination of sex discrimination case law shows the concept of equality the
Court has been building off of since the feminist movement in the 1960s. The framework
these feminists were working with was a concept of “equal treatment” that was informed
by stereotypes of femininity that were articulated to protect women, but in actuality
limited them. Holding a job and raising children at the same time was almost impossible,
as women’s ability to be anything but mothers was highly suspect by cultural norms. The
Court was fully operating on cultural expectations of women at the time, rather than
equal treatment.
While the NAACP was articulating to the Court how laws which treated African
Americans differently were deserving of strict scrutiny, laws that treated women
differently than men were not questioned yet. Litigators challenging sex discrimination
had the task of convincing the Court that women were not inherently different than men,
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just like African Americans were not inherently different than white people. Thus, any
limitations put on women were arbitrary and deserved a higher level of review from the
court and a compelling state interest.
The initial approach of the liberal feminist movement was to focus legal
arguments on strict equality. To do this, litigants denied that there was any difference
between the sexes, and thus they should be treated alike. As a leader of this strategy, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, through her founding of the ACLU’s Women’s Project, worked at
convincing the Court that stereotypes of women were not a compelling state interest to
limit women from experiencing full personhood under the law. This strategy was best at
dismantling overt legal restrictions the law imposed on women and was called the
assimilation approach.34 She not only lived out this theory by being one of the first
female lawyers at the time, but she spearheaded caselaw that slowly expanded and
presented this idea of equality for women before the Court.
At the time of Reed, Justice Ginsburg’s argument was radical. Explicitly informed
by feminist theorist Simone de Beauvoir, Ginsburg began to bring feminist theory into the
Supreme Court. Her first case was Reed v. Reed (1971), in which a Idaho state law
defaulted to males over females when deciding who gets administrator privileges over an
estate.35 Sally Reed was separated from her husband and sued the state for sex
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discrimination when they gave her husband administrator rights over their previously
joint owned estate. Ginsburg used this case to articulate a provision of due process that
had never before been used to accommodate the different lived experiences between men
and women. Behind this law was the assumption that women are not as capable as men to
manage property. The Reed case provided an explicit example of discrimination that
limited women in the civic sphere.
When Justice Ginsburg spoke to the Burger Court, she had to conceptualize a
theory of equality that accommodated the Court’s narrow view of women. Women had
been differentiated by the courts as a special kind of classification that needed special
protections due to their weak nature. Muller v. Oregon (1908), and its accompanying
Brandeis brief, legitimized a women’s domestic role in society through maximum labor
laws that only applied to women.36 In the words of the unanimous court:
“That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is
especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are
not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time
on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon
the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race.” 37
Documented in 1908, the Court thought of women as different from men, as
delicate, as mothers, and as situated in the domestic sphere of law. These assumptions
were rationalized as “women’s physical structure” and thus her propensity to have a
passive nature that was deserving of protection and resulted in limitations on women in
36
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the civic sphere. Feminists criticized these laws as in place to “protect” this image of
women and ensure the perpetuation of the tradition or belief that this was indeed the way
that gender works.38 This notion of equality as paternalistic put women in an extremely
limited position. In Reed, this view of women was relevant for the wife that wanted
administrators rights over her estate, and was only denied them because of her gender.
But for the Court at the time, women were mothers first, and everything else second. It
was no wonder that Ginsburg and legal feminist scholars at the time conceptualized the
fight for equality to directly combat these perverse stereotypes and limitations on women
due to their “nature.”39 Ginsburg called for equal treatment as sameness, stating in her
brief that:
“Although the legislator may distinguish between individuals on the basis of their
need or ability, it is presumptively impermissible to distinguish on the basis on an
unalterable identifying trait over which the individual has no control and for
which he or she should not be disadvantaged by the law. Legislative
discrimination grounded on sex, for purposes unrelated to any biological
difference between the sexes, ranks with legislative discrimination based on
race…and merits no greater judicial deference… Laws which disable women
from full participation in the political, business and economic areas are often
characterized as ‘protective’ and beneficial. Those same laws applied to racial or
ethnic minorities would readily be recognized as invidious and impermissible.
The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer
inspection, been revealed as a cage.”40
Ginsburg made the case that gender functioned similarly to race in that no tangible
difference related to biology existed between men and women. Ginsburg succeeded in her
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first step to achieve a higher level of judicial scrutiny for laws that treated the men and
women differently with a rational basis review. It was a necessary first step to combat
overt and explicit limitations on women. Reed was the first time the Court ruled that a
law was unconstitutional for the sole reason of denying certain rights based on sex. Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the Court: “Regardless of their sex,
persons within any one of the enumerated classes of that section are similarly situated
with respect to that objective. By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who
are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.” 41
Ginsburg took the cue from the Court that they were willing to take up challenges
to laws that treated the sexes differently. Inherent in this was the chance to argue to the
Court that women’s roles were not limited to mothers, caretakers, or wives. Women were
just as dynamic as men and deserved just as much protection and opportunity as men to
live out their lives with autonomy and respect. This was the articulation of equality
Justice Ginsburg aimed for when she argued Reed.42 However, legal rhetoric that
assumed a male as the subject of law veiled the less overt, but just as harmful, instances
of gender discrimination.43 Reed was successful because it started the conversation with
the Court that some laws treated the sexes differently and this distinction was arbitrary.
Yet the “equality” the Court developed was one of erasing difference between the genders
rather than embracing them and dismantling their limitations. The language Justice
41
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Burger used in his main opinion stemmed from a vision of equality that treated all cases
alike, while not robustly accounting for the differences between the subjects. The Idaho
law violated the Equal Protection Clause, because according to the litigant’s argument
and the Court’s interpretation, when dealing with estate rights, men and women are
similarly positioned to take on administrator rights. There is, then, no difference between
them and the law should treat them as similar subjects, rather than defaulting to men.
This version of equality pushes the narrative that so long as men and women are alike,
the laws should not treat them differently. Yet how would the court account for situations
in which the “sexual difference” was relevant to the position of women?
The legal development of treating men and women as similar subjects was
furthered in Fronterio v. Richardson (1973), two years after Reed.44 Sharon Fronterio was
not permitted to claim her husband as a dependent in order to receive social security
benefits from the military benefit policy after serving in the army as a lieutenant. Again,
we see how the stereotype of women being tied to the home and dependent on men was
informing the law. The ACLU Women’s Project succeeded in convincing four Justices
that a higher level of scrutiny should be applied to gender cases due to the salient and
entrenched history of sex discrimination in American law. Justice Brennan recognized
that “…statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously
relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual
capabilities of its individual members” and thus, these laws needed a higher level of
review than just the rational basis that was employed in Reed. The narrative that men and
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women are the same and women should not be limited by the law persisted as litigants’
strategy and this concept of equality as sameness was carried through in further sex
discrimination cases.
The logic that laws informed by arbitrary stereotypes of the genders should be
subjected to a higher level of judicial review was further solidified in Craig v. Boren
(1976).45 The facts of the case seem almost arbitrary for the Supreme Court, but perhaps
the juvenile nature of the case showcased the unsophisticated reasoning behind laws that
treat the genders differently. Craig, a male under twenty one years old, challenged an
Oklahoma law that permitted eighteen year old women to buy beer but did not allow her
male counterparts to do the same until he was twenty-one years-old. The Court agreed
that under its Equal protection analysis of Frontiero that this law’s chosen means to
furthering a state interest was poorly adapted to that end. In their opinion, Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and Blackmun articulated a standard of
intermediate scrutiny, now a higher level, that had to be applied to laws that treated the
genders differently.

A. Feminist Criticisms of Assimilation/Denial of Difference Between the Sexes
————————————————————————————————————
While it was a success to convince the Court that differential treatment based on
gender should be constitutionally suspect by eliminating gender difference from an
analysis of equality, it still did not change the reality that women can have children while
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men cannot. The approach of formal equality was initially to deny any difference
between the sexes. Consequently, there was no mention of reproduction in the arguments
to the Court in Reed, Richardson, and Boren. This “difference as sameness” approach
would later be criticized by feminist legal scholars such as Catharine Mackinnon who
claim that difference as sameness perpetuates the innate masculinity in legal doctrine and
does little to change the oppression of femininity.46
Feminist criticisms of this approach have warned that a robust and genuine
representation of equal protection needs to account for women’s reproductive role as
natural and not situated in the private sphere of liberal protection. A thread of feminist
critique developed its search for equality to account for the ways women are biologically
different, but do not default as subordinate to men. The goal was to show how the
feminization of the home in a liberal system puts women down, constructed to the
normative understanding that women are just the weaker sex. As Laura Stein and many
liberal feminists developed,

“‘To have substantive equality between the sexes… the law must accommodate
women's particular reproductive role’ and without it, equality doctrine ‘may help
perpetuate the separate spheres ideology, both because it can be interpreted as
accepting that women, as childbearers, are and will always be the primary
childrearers….Rather than achieving power for women generally, the minority of
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women who do operate in the public sphere will, in order to succeed, necessarily
be co-opted into the preexisting male-defined value system.’”47

The equality doctrine, at this point in case law, has fallen short of a robust concept
required to directly challenge women’s oppression. The facts of Reed, Richardson, and
Boren made these cases about women in civic life: managing estates, purchasing beer,
and employment benefits. Yet, these cases allowed women into the public sphere as long
as they were like men and lead to a one dimensional concept of equality that only worked
for some women and “co-opted” them into a “preexisting male-defined system.”
Materially, women have been let into the public sphere without the proper
accommodations to make sure they have equal footing with their male counterparts.
“Difference as sameness” only holds in situations in which women’s reproductive life is
not glaringly at issue, or if women bend over backwards to hide it.
This thread of critique can also be understood as a positive and negative rights
issue. The negative interpretation of the equal protection clause was utilized in gender
discrimination case law. Reed, Richardson, and Boren resulted in a higher level of
scrutiny for laws that discriminate the sexes without demanding any sort of affirmative
protection to women in the civic sphere. According to MacKinnon, this is what resulted
in women being allowed in the civic sphere as long as they suppressed their femininity
and assimilated to the male run and defined public sphere. Theoretically, the feminine
needed to remain tied to the private sphere to perpetuate the public/private dichotomy
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that was essential for political liberalism. Gender discrimination case law did little to
challenge this dichotomy and instead worked towards dismantling glaring limitations on
women in civic life. The consequences of this case law materialized in the treatment of
pregnant women in the law.

B. Pregnancy Discrimination
————————————————————————————————————
The treatment of pregnancy as a disability shows the problematic
conceptualization of the Equal Protection Clause the Court continued to develop.
Feminist legal theory accounted for the “dilemmas of difference”, which happens when a
decision encompasses assumptions about the genders and solidifies them as inevitable or
unchangeable, when really it is just one point of view.48 By not protecting women’s
biological differences in “equal treatment”, it became the unstated norm that people
working should not become pregnant. Male norms informed laws, and thus “employment
policies concerning pregnancy are notorious examples warranting separate mention” for
the limited construct of equality the Court developed. 49 The treatment of pregnant women
shows the consequences of the difference as sameness approach. While the sameness
argument made theoretical sense, it made little material sense for the lives of actual
women and men trying to practice autonomy in their lives. A encyclopedia of feminist
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legal scholarship synthesizes that many feminists studying law were outraged by the
treatment of pregnant women. It became a great example of the unwavering patriarchal
institutions that still exist, despite gender discrimination case law, that controls the bodies
of women:
“Men and women were being treated the same: neither received pregnancy
benefits. So men did not receive any benefits that women did not receive. And
women did not receive any benefits that men did not receive. The logical
implication was that requiring a benefits program to include pregnancy benefits
for women would entitle them not to equal rights, but to special rights; not to
equal treatment but to special treatment… Feminists were stunned by this
argument—after all, only women can become pregnant.”50
Attitudes towards pregnant bodies, that they don't belong in the civil sphere, denied
women accommodations for their difference and instead pushed them to hide pregnancy
or deal with the experience themselves. This was seen as the consequence of women
trying to be like men and thus, deserving of equal treatment. “Special rights” or
accommodations for sexual difference became shameful. Yet, this stood in stark contrast
to the liberation of women. It was a the “maternal function” of women that “formed the
basis of a dual system of law” and perpetuated the feminization of the privacy doctrine. 51
Equality for women was not robust without the accommodation of women’s biological
ability to have children. Given the assumption that women’s primary role in society was
to be mothers, pregnant women in the workplace had no protection over their bodies and
jobs once they became pregnant while employed. In General Electric v. Gilbert (1976),
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the employers provided insurance to its workers that did not include disabilities from
pregnancy. The Court had to decide if the exclusion of pregnancy violated Title VII. They
reasoned that because the disability plan split the employers up into groups that included
both sexes in it, there was no sex discrimination on the part of General Electric. With
their ruling, the Court set the precedent that pregnancy was going to be treated like any
other disability for insurance claims. Pregnant women in the workforce were not given
any protection under the law despite the fact that it was only women who could become
pregnant while working and thus it was not the same as a “disability” that could
potentially affect the entire population with equal distribution. Classifying pregnancy as a
general disability is clearly not representative of the realities in which women live their
lives. While the opportunity to have a family and work at the same time may be possible
in theory, the lack of protection of reproductive decisions excludes and limits women
through their reproductive capabilities.
Here lies the fork in the road from equal protection to privacy for the reproductive
rights movement. Decision barring gender discrimination was rooted in the Equal
Protection clause with no mention of reproduction, while Roe was established under the
right to privacy and with no mention of equality between the sexes. This fracture of the
equality/privacy arguments lead the Court to make interpretations in what the equal
treatment of women in society would entail. It was the efforts of scholars such as
Ginsburg at the time to advance equality through litigation and the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA). The ERA was advocated for predominantly by the group National
Organization for Women. The amendment was proposed as such in 1972 in Congress:
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“Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.” 52
The amendment was defeated in 1982, but its proposal fueled the dialogue around
the treatment of women in the law. Before intermediate scrutiny was won in Boren,
Ginsburg saw the ERA as another catalyst for the Court to take on sex discrimination
cases “in earnest” and that it would help litigators flag which State laws treat the sexes
differently and thus needed suspect review.53 The belief behind the legal strategy
Ginsburg and the ACLU utilized was that dismantling gender stereotypes would convince
the Court to adopt a higher level of scrutiny for gendered laws. Theoretically, then,
equality rested on the concept that there was no legitimate difference between the ability
of the sexes to be dynamic individuals. Consequently then, Justice Ginsburg began to
pick away at the assumptions the Court had that made women unequal to and more
limited than men on a case by case basis. Labor laws, child custody laws, social security
laws, and liquor laws were all used to show the arbitrary differential treatment women
endured that were ultimately dangerous and thus deserving of a higher level of scrutiny.
While Justice Ginsburg made major advancements for women and gender equality,
abortion was not a part of the equality argument that was developed for the Court. Thus,
to the Court, women’s reproductive abilities was left out of the logic that women should
not limited by their ability to have children.
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At the time of Gilbert, the general attitudes towards disabled people was one of
paternalistic pity that assumed people with disabilities were “not expected to lead normal
lives.”54 This same logic was present towards women when the Court made its decision
in Gilbert. Instead of providing accommodations for pregnant women to allow them to
work and raise a family at the same time, any barrier removal for women was treated as a
privilege rather than a right. This was due in part to the negative right side of equality that
became the doctrine for equal protection. Women’s control over their reproductive lives is
an unmet condition for equality as long as this logic persists. While the development for
disability rights adopted the belief that “…people with disabilities are oppressed more by
society than by their disabilities,”55 and thus any law that restricts a disabled person was
discrimination, women have not achieved this logic as a category. The consequence was
“the way government chooses to aid people with disabilities… ‘It looks as though the
federal government prefers to keep disabled people down than help them up.’”56
Feminists argue the same can be noted about the legal treatment of women and how every
step forward only worked to uphold institutional limitations on the feminine. As Wendy
Williams writes:
“Due process and equal protection doctrines produce distinctly different
constraints and consequences. Because the two doctrines focus on different
aspects of the reproductive phenomenon—the one on protecting the liberty to
make certain reproductive choices free of state intervention, the other on
whether the state has treated the sexes evenhandedly…in all contacts in which
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pregnancy is regulated, a concern for the equality as well as the liberty
implication of the regulation is warranted.”57
Williams’ analysis shows one of the many ways the application of equality was
insufficient to capture the totality of what equal protection for women would really look
like. The negative interpretations of privacy and equality boundaries in reproductive
choice cases allowed for the Court’s biases to determine how women’s control over their
bodily decisions were made.

C. Equality as a Negative Right
————————————————————————————————————
So far, I have shown how the utility of an equality argument for gender
discrimination resulted in a narrow view of womanhood that works to default women into
the private sphere as mothers. The negative rights use of equality created a uphill battle
for women trying to engage in civic life. Women’s admission into civic life is conditional:
as long as they assimilate to the male defined norms, they can stay. But the moment
women disrupt this order, they are mistreated and not protected fully by the law.
Pregnancy discrimination proves the best example of this limitation on women. Due to
male norms, maternal functions are not welcome in the work force and the law was not
interpenetrated to adequately protect women’s full personhood inside and outside the
home. Thus, reproductive rights case law and its development is crucial for the concept of
female autonomy and its fluidity between the spheres. An affirmative protection of
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female reproductive abilities has the potential to deliver a concept of autonomy for
women that is just as robust and respected as the males. Jill Lepore has suggested that an
equality argument would work towards this ideal for abortion cases and could help
litigants argue for more healthcare protection for women. Yet as I have showcased, the
equality argument as applied to women so far, has not delivered its full potential. But to
access the legitimacy of the argument for equality, we first need to understand how
privacy has been developed and applied for reproductive rights cases.
Reproductive choice jurisprudence has been developed as a freedom from
government interference in a choice, rather than an affirmative provision of them. The
treatment of pregnant women is crucial to the understanding of the consequences of not
having a dynamic positive concept of equality. Arguing reproductive choice doctrine
under a privacy argument may have been the best available tool for litigators at the time,
but it has developed into a underwhelming and misguided delivery of both privacy and
equality that has held women back from the public sphere and thwarted development of
their full potential.
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Chapter 3: Privacy and Reproductive Rights
————————————————————————————————————
Reproductive rights has developed out of a right to privacy. The privacy
framework, in its broadest summary, has made the Court revisit and rebalance the state
interest to protect fetal rights versus a woman’s protected sphere of privacy. The Court,
through reproductive rights case law, has battled with exactly what this intangible sphere
of privacy includes in due process required from the state. In general, one approach is to
ask for restraint from the state to not interfere with individual autonomy and decision
making. The other asks for the guarantee that each individual has the same ability to
make autonomous decisions for themselves. One interpretation sanctions the private
sphere of society and the other calls into question the distribution of power in the public
sphere that inherently affects how individuals make personal choices. If privacy is on a
spectrum of requiring intervention from the state on one end and asking for space from
the state on the other, reproductive rights has gone further on the negative end. There
have been moments where the position of women in society has been acknowledged by
the Court, but the laws and balancing tests out of this case history ultimately leave the
distribution of power and the oppression of women unchallenged.
In the 1960s in Connecticut, contraception was not completely legalized. Paul and
Pauline Poe, a traditional married couple, were seeking contraception due to Pauline’s
serious health concerns. The majority of the Court ruled in Poe v. Ullman (1961) that the
plaintiffs lacked any sort of reason to challenge the law, since it was not enforced.58 One
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of the dissenters of the Court that day was Justice John Marshall Harlan. In his separate
opinion, Justice Harlan wrote about an expanded view of liberty and an early articulation
of a right to privacy that later informed Justice William Douglas’s opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965).59 Justice Harlan viewed due process, or protection under the law, as a
"rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.”60 Justice Harlan saw no reason why the
state of Connecticut should make a law to prohibit couples from buying contraception.
The wording of “arbitrary impositions” and “purposeless restraints” was later developed
into a compelling state interest. Without one, the government could not infringe on the
freedom protected by Justice Harlan’s expanded interpretation of due process.
Privacy was a vague idea, and for a while the Court grappled with exactly how
much it would protect. A slippery slope argument was that privacy doctrine could
eventually protect all of society’s greatest “sins” and all social order would be backwards.
Or in other words, there was a fear that the status quo would be disrupted if more
autonomy was accessible for all citizens under the constitution. To ease this critique,
Justice Harlan kept the concept of privacy nuanced and downplayed it. In Poe, Justice
Harlan first assured that the right to privacy “is not an absolute. Thus, I would not suggest
that adultery, homosexuality, fortification and incest are immune from criminal inquiry,
however privately practiced.” However as Justice Harlan was trying to establish the
boarders of privacy, he made a specific note of the kind of relationship he thought was

59

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)

60

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)

40

especially deserving of sanction and privacy from the state, namely the relationship of
marriage. Justice Harlan wrote that "the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage,” and thus must enjoy
protection from state interference.61 Marriage, he continued, was “an institution which the
State must not only allow, but which always and in every age has fostered and protected.
It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extramarital sexuality
altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a
marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the
criminal law and the details of that intimacy.”62 For Harlan, privacy bolstered the value of
marriage. Poe was one vote shy of overruling the Connecticut 1879 law. Harlan's dissent
and the Court’s ruling that the law lacked a way to challenge it paved the way to
legalizing a right to privacy.
It is important to note the absolutes that Justice Harlan, and eventually the Court,
recognized in whatever it was that privacy meant to them at the time. It was first
articulated to protect a woman and her husband’s joint liberty through the legitimacy of
the institution that marriage was. Female autonomy, as it is understood and protected
today, was founded on her link to her husband and through the legitimacy of marriage.
How far has privacy doctrine really come from habitualizing and practicing this way of
thinking? This understanding of privacy was made law in Griswold. After Poe,
reproductive rights litigants took the ruling as a green light to start opening up women’s
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clinics that could give women access to contraception. One of these clinics was then shut
down and criminalized under the same Connecticut law. Forced to reexamine the law, the
Justices established a right to privacy when Justice Douglas wrote that there are
“penumbras” in the Bill of Rights that create “zones of privacy” and this protected a
married couples decision to use contraception or not.63 Again, the privacy of the husband
and wife as a unit was seen as protected from the State. The origins of female autonomy
over the decision to have children or not was seen as a family decision made in joint with
the male counterpart, rather than a choice the women is protected to make herself.
Marriage and the male counterpart was essential for the Court’s first understanding of
privacy over sexual decisions. However salient this conservative way of thinking was in
the Court, it was challenged by litigants ten years later.

A. The Legitimacy of a Right to Privacy
————————————————————————————————————
The next step the Court made in developing the right to privacy was to emphasize
the protection individuals have from the State. In Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), the Court
overturned a Massachusetts law criminalizing the use of contraception by unmarried
couples. The Court’s argument relied in part on the Equal Protection Clause, noting the
differential treatment between married and unmarried couples. Justice Willian J. Brennan
emphasized that the right to privacy is expansive enough to encompass just the
individuals’ protection from state intrusion. He wrote:
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“whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the
rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike. If under
Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried person would be equally
permissible...If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.” 64

This expanded interpretation for what the right to privacy entails carried the Court to the
landmark decision of Roe v. Wade (1973). The Justices were able to recognize the value
of individualized privacy through the priming of legitimizing private sexual decisions
married and heterosexual couples make as one. Roe was an attempt to extend this right to
the individual, including specifically the female and her body.
In the facts of Roe, Texas, like most states at the time, outlawed abortion except to
save a woman’s life. This view of abortion gave no protection to female autonomy over
the decision process. In the pre-Roe world, only a severe medical condition determined
by a doctor could constitute an ability to exercise enough control over a pregnancy to
make the choice to terminate. In a 7-2 decision, the Court honored the development of the
role of privacy already articulated in the contraception cases. If the focus on liberty was
expansive enough to protect a woman’s decision to use contraception, then it was
expansive enough to protect a woman’s decision to have a child or not, even after the
pregnancy was already started.
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The Court drew on Griswold and ruled in Roe that the “concept of personal
‘liberty’ embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; or in personal,
marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its
penumbras…” establishes the right for a women to terminate her pregnancy.65 This
decision honored the concept of privacy originated in Poe, emphasizing the “right to be
left alone” from the state. At the time, it was not surprising that litigants on the pro-choice
side chose to pursue the privacy argument. As a widely accepted logic, “Privacy was
compatible with a legal tradition of non-interference in marriage; a tradition that
buttresses the conservative idea that the personal is separate from the political, and that
the larger social structure has no impact on private, individual choice. The privacy
framework assumes that society bears no affirmative responsibility for individual choice
or action.”66 Herein lies the problem of the Court’s interpretation of privacy. Even though
the movement as a whole was working towards and envisioning a concept of privacy that
could hold the State accountable to the realities women faced when making reproductive
decisions, the Court clung to the conservative and “hands off” way of treating sexual
decision making as the basis for this protection from state interference in an individual’s
personal decision making.
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B. The Feminist Critique of Roe
————————————————————————————————————
The Roe decision has been subject to intense scrutiny, including among feminist
legal scholars. 67 While the immediate backlash was robust, it is ongoing even though
most feminist scholarship has turned to a focus on identity politics. 68 Constitutional
scholar Jack M. Balkin started a dialogue among other legal scholars in a debate about
the legal basis of Roe. The criticisms generated are filled with insightful critiques and
interpretations of the law, many of which derive from legal theory not tapped into by the
Court.
One such theorist is Reva B. Siegel, a feminist legal scholar and expert in
Constitutional law. Siegel's scholarship is particularly insightful here, as her work
provides a way to discuss both privacy and equality doctrine inherent in abortion case
law. In her mock judicial opinion of Roe, Siegel advocates for the equality argument as
the most compelling basis for a right to an abortion, rather than the privacy argument. Her
argument derives from the concept of equality developed out of sex discrimination cases.
In her view, abortion regulations should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, as “abortion
restrictions are deeply tied to the stereotypical views about the sexes and about the duties
of women.”69 Siegel draws on the concept of equality that the Court has available now.
She notes that “as we have come to understand it, the equal citizenship principle
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embodied in the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments prohibits state action premised
on traditional assumptions about the sexes that perpetuates second-class citizenship for
women.” Siegel cites Reed to illustrate that a proper use of equal protection could extend
to abortion regulations, as they perpetuate stereotypes of women and the Court has a
commitment to stopping this discrimination. She continues by making the point that
women are not different citizens than men just because they can have children.
Siegel draws on the negative concept of equality, or “equality as sameness”
principle that filled earlier feminist interpretation of gender discrimination. While I agree
with Siegel’s interpretation of what argument can be made given the equality doctrine in
the Court currently, I am skeptical that even this legal basis of Roe would not garner any
robust version of equality for women. Siegel’s equality argument would not require the
state to ensure that stereotypes of women do not occur, rather that abortions cannot be
restricted if they coerce a women into pregnancy. However, this interpretation lacks any
sort of intersectional concerns on the different experiences of women. For marginalized
women, reproductive justice may require combating sterilization practices rather than
abortion restrictions.70 Reproductive justice is not just about securing abortion, but about
creating institutions that allow women to author their own lives. I fear that Siegel’s utility
of equality focuses too much on citizenship and her view of what makes citizenship equal
for women, rather than on developing female autonomy. While adopting a strict scrutiny
review for abortion laws may lead to less restrictive laws, I am skeptical that this
application of equality would change the focus of the Court’s rhetoric. Siegel’s argument
Dean Spade, "Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society 38, no. 4 (Summer 2013): 1031-1055.
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still gives the state the ability to judge and regulate “good citizen bodies (those that are
married, heterosexual, reproductive, and white)” and “noncitizen bodies
(nonheterosexual, nonreproductive, engaging in sex for pleasure, and nonwhite).”71 An
emphasis on negative equality still treats women as the same as men, without embracing
feminine experiences as different yet no worse and no better. Another strain of feminist
critique of Roe stems from Justice Ginsberg herself.72
In 2013, Justice Ginsburg shared her critique of Roe, stating that as well as not
using a gradual policy shift, the litigation approach wasn't women centered.73 How could
it be, when the rhetoric inside and outside the Court was largely focused on fetal rights
and the anxieties of the New Right?74 Justice Ginsburg advocates for a new lens to the
legal analysis for abortion cases—one that considers the woman’s position as the vocal
point. Siegel may envision this change to come from the utility of the equality doctrine
rather than the privacy doctrine. However, while Siegel’s approach is radical in that it
advocates for a new legal basis of Roe, it still utilizes the same logic behind the equality
doctrine that has not produced effective equality for women. Legal scholarship has
criticized the litigants behind reproductive rights for falling into the trap of staying too
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close to the legal frameworks in the Court. Being afraid to ask for more has yielded little
change and an illegitimately of the reproductive rights movement for some:
“Central to the lessons one draws from...abortion...is that framing of the legal
arguments tendered before the Court was important to the ultimate resolution of
the issues. In both cases, initial “liberal” victories were forged and then lost, in
significant part, because their defenders doggedly clung to their understanding of
the Court's logic. This fatally constrained their ability to shift argumentational
grounds when those victories came under threat. This was called the “tyranny
of absolutes,” the notion that legal arguments, once seemingly won, are absolute
and defensible only on those grounds. Without the argumentational flexibility to
adapt to new conditions, the tyranny of absolutes lead abolitionists and pro-choice
advocates to dig their own doctrinal graves by ignoring alternative arguments that
might have saved the underlying goals their initial victories were intended to
achieve and protect.” 75
It is important to note that Epstein and Kobylka add to the scholarship on legal change by
showing that the courts can be a place for the status quo to prevail and reiterate much of
the same concepts at its origin. Feminist scholarship would add that this nature continues
the gendered treatment of the law. When Roe was decided, it was inevitable that any
doctrine used would be coming from a gendered place. Scholarship has show that
changing the legal discourse within the courts is possible and if not attempted, the same
norms will continue to be reinstated without a doubt. For women and abortion rights, this
has meant a history of state interference on women’s autonomy and therefore women
equality.
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C. Limits of Privacy
————————————————————————————————————
The trimester framework the Court outlined later in Roe perpetuated a logic of
privacy that limited a woman’s ability to participate fully in society because of her
reproductive abilities. The Court honors the individual’s right to be left alone in-so-far as
the state cannot arbitrarily stop a woman from ending a pregnancy. While their ruling
protects women from some groundless limitations on reproductive health decisions, the
logic does not ensure the lifting of barriers for women. Under privacy, the state does not
have to even the playing field for women when they are pregnant or trying not to be. Here
we see it as a negative right; privacy does not require active protection. Rather, it is a offhands approach to leaving women alone to make their decisions. In Roe, the trimester
framework was the test the Justices set up to guide state’s interference in the privacy of a
woman and her childbearing decisions. Later, I will discuss how the transition from the
trimester framework to a undue burden analysis allowed for interpretations of female
autonomy that was so focused on fetal life that it took away from the practical right to an
abortion.
After the Court established the right to an abortion, they outlined a balancing test
to accommodate any state interest in protecting the well-being of the fetus. Called the
trimester rule, the Court outlined the following scale of protection a woman could expect
during her pregnancy:
“First trimester: the decision is between a woman and her physician
Second trimester: the states can “regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are
reasonably related to maternal health.”
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Third trimester: “the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except when it is
necessary...for the preservation or health of the mother…”76

At the time, this standard was considered medically driven and it ensured the autonomy
of the woman in the first trimester. This unregulated autonomy, guaranteed in the first
trimester at least, was later challenged in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and
replaced with the “undue burden” standard. As defined by the Supreme Court, a undue
burden analysis claims that a “law is invalid if its purpose or effect is to place substantial
obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”77
But to see how the Court got to this analysis, it is important to see the immediate
regression the Court took to the individual liberty supposedly guaranteed to women after
its decision in Roe.
The immediate backlash of Roe established a well practiced routine the State and
pro-choice litigators have been adding to ever since the decision in 1973. States push the
boundary of how much they can restrict abortion access, while reproductive rights
litigators try to defend and reiterate the privacy right of all women. Increasingly, the
morality of protecting a fetus has taken precedent over the protected privacy of women.
Already on weak footing, the logic in Roe did not translate into equality for women
through a control over their reproductive lives. Harris v. McRae (1980)78 is the most
blatant departure from any logic towards a robust or positive rights concept of female

76

Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973)

77

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)

78

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)

50

equality. In Harris, Justice Stewart wrote for the majority opinion that “although
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of
choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigence falls in the latter
category.”79 Again we see privacy being interpreted as a negative right. The Court did not
require state funding for abortion because of the “hands-off” approach to privacy it had
drawn on in privacy doctrine. While the Court allowed abortion, the right to access it was
not seen or treated as a necessary component of women’s freedom. Instead, it was
something in which the Court tried to refrain from interfering in. When Justice Stewart
wrote that “indigence” was something a women created for herself, it showcased the
limited understanding the Court had on discrimination against women, especially
unprivileged women. Without state funding for abortion, access to already limited
reproductive health care was only possible for women who were able to travel and pay
for services. This reality was and is devastating for a movement that was first started in
the 1960’s for “…the woman of color who does not know she can space her children,
who cannot afford to go to a private doctor, who is being discriminated against by the
Connecticut law.”80 Estelle Griswold spoke those words when she first started her
crusade for reproductive justice for Planned Parenthood in the 1960s. Another activist,
Lee Buxon said that the problem “all adds up to the rich getting contraceptives and the
poor getting children.”81
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Harris showcased that the Court did not understand abortion from a positive
rights framework or feminist equality approach. Abortion was not valued as a necessity
that needed to be made available for women, but rather something it wanted little
involvement in. The fear behind granting women comprehensive sexual health care is
really a fear of disrupting the status quo. Only certain women are able to access the
resources to make a fully autonomous decision over when to have a family or not. The
scarcity of this freedom makes female autonomy or ability to control almost shameful.
Perhaps this is due to an interest in unborn life, but also because of the underlying
assumption that women are solely meant to be mothers and do not have full autonomy as
individuals. Rhonda Coplan writes that “The explosive response to Roe attests to the
deeply radical nature of the demand, first by feminists and then by lesbians and gays, for
a power so fundamental in our traditional liberal constitutional scheme as control over
one’s body.”82 Putting aside the gay rights movement for now, abortion was at its core a
movement asking for women’s equality, even though the legal doctrine did not reflect
that. On the ground, women and doctors were organizing services, campaigns, and
trainings to do everything they could to protect a woman’s power over her reproductive
health. From sexual education to abortion access, the reproductive rights movement,
especially after the shock of Webster, strove to be an inclusive feminist movement
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focused on individual equality, rather than “privacy.”83 However, these intentions, no
matter how thought out and articulate they were, got lost in the legal logic.
Why was this so? David Garrow invites the nuance that “Rather than simply
viewing the women’s ‘crusade against abortion’ as manifesting as a primary concern for
fetuses, their activism should instead be seen as a ‘symbolic defense of traditional
conceptions of morality.’” The attitudes of the Pro-Life movement were shown to be
more than they let on in their legal arguments. Garrow writes that:
“‘There exists beneath the surface in young pro-life groups a deeply rooted
respect and admiration of the traditional women and the glories of motherhood.
This is accompanied by a corresponding disrespect for and hatred of the modern
women as depicted by the feminist movement.’ For many right-to-lifers, this
commentator recounted, the abortion crusade was essentially a ‘means to an end,’
for it was a highly viable way of ‘fighting the anti-family and animi-traditional
image that abortion is seen to promote.’ A less sympathetic professor made the
same point more bluntly: ‘the meanings resonating from abortion politics have
more to do with compulsory heterosexuality, family structure, the relationship
between men and women and parents and children, and women’s employment,
than they do with the fetus.’” 84
These motivations contrasted to the actual legal arguments preoccupying the Court,
showing an unfocused reasoning of the rights that were at stake for women in the next
abortion rights cases. If the pro-life movement was really there to keep traditional
femininity alive in the laws, then the focus on privacy and state interest almost seemed
off-base. The necessary conversation was on stereotypes and how limitations were
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safeguarded by abortion regulations and violated women’s equal standing in society.
However, the Court was caught up in a very different logic.
The next series of cases dealt with states’ regulations limiting abortion access. In
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Care, (1983) the Court was asked
to determine the constitutionality of a Ohio law that had a hospital requirement for
abortion, a minor consent requirement, an information requirement, a 24-hour waiting
period, and a disposal requirement. The Court struck down these provisions as a
departure from the trimester framework and ruled that Ohio lacked a compelling interest
for these limitations on women’s access to abortion services. Although the decision was
good news for pro-choice litigators at the time, Justice O’Connor’s dissent began the
debate over changing the balancing test the Court would use to protect female liberty.
While the Akron decision could be interpreted to focus on the position of the woman to
make a free choice, Justice O’Connor attempted to turn the focus to the viability of the
fetus and the developing state interest in protecting viable life in light of a fast changing
medical world. This shift would propel the discussion away from a woman-centered
rhetoric for abortion.
In Akron, Justice O’Connor’s dissent urged the Court to adopt a new framework
for determining the legality of abortion laws. She advocated to get rid of the trimester
framework because she thought the Roe standard was “…on a collision course with itself.
As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State
may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth.
As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus,
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the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.” 85 Her logic stems not
from the value of protecting female autonomy, but from protecting any life that could live
outside the womb and how the Court should legally balance a fetal right to life with a
women’s right to privacy. Justice O’Connor was concerned that the courts will have to
speculate about what was “accepted medical practice” at any point in time, rather than
supporting their decisions on legal doctrine. 86 To remedy this, Justice O’Connor outlined
an “undue burden” standard for the first time in her Akron dissent. Her focus was on the
state’s role: “Roe is intended to protect against state action ‘drastically limiting the
availability and safety of the desired service’…” 87 The Court eventually adopted this
standard in Casey after several more battles of state interest and privacy rights in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians (1986) and Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services (1989).
In Thornbourgh, the Court evaluated a Pennsylvania state law that required
informed printed consent from the woman, an extensive warning of risks of an abortion,
certain reporting procedures of abortion by the provider, the use of specific medical
techniques after viability, and the presence of a second physician for post-viability cases.
The Court struck down these requirements as provisions used to deter a women from
having an abortion. Then three years later in Webster, the Court was asked again the same
question of constitutionality for a Missouri law that restricted state funds and employees
from performing or assisting with abortion. Further the restrictions imposed counseling
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on abortion for women. While not so much different than the Pennsylvania law in
Thornbourgh, the Court upheld the restrictions in Webster. Webster was written in a way
that restricted public funding of abortion, encouraged adoption in place of abortion, and
strengthened the influence of the State after twenty weeks gestation. The Court
interpreted this to not break any standard set in Roe “as no affirmative right to the use of
state aid for non-therapeutic abortions existed.”88 The Court’s legal interpretation of the
restriction in Webster may have been justified to honor Roe, but the material effects of
legislation that works to restrict abortion through a emphasis on fetal life had the same
materialized limiting effect for women and their autonomy.
After Webster it was clear to many advocates and scholars of the reproductive
rights movement that their strategy needed to change. The study of social movements is a
study of multiple variables, many of which unknown and unmeasurable, interacting with
each other to create “change”. While this paper is a study of the Court and legal doctrine,
it is important to understand the rhetoric behind litigants of reproductive rights and the
larger context in which they were working. As the pro-choice side did its work, so did the
pro-life side. However, the pro-life side at the time of Webster, and building up to Casey,
was hostile to women’s rights and any development of a positive right to privacy.
Furthermore, the pro-life side had politics on its side with the election of President
Ronald Reagan. The Reagan Justice Department worked to make abortion an entrenched
political issue when they sent representatives into Court to fight strongly against it.
During Akron and Thornburgh, it was “the first time since Roe that, pro-choice advocates
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faced effective opposition from the national government instead of state attorneys with
minimal interest or limited expertise in the subject of Supreme Court advocacy.”89
Additionally, the replacement of Powell and Stewart with O’Connor and Kennedy opened
up the Court for the infiltration of an anti-choice sentiment.
The decision in Webster was in part set up by a change in political and judicial
environment. However, some scholars have argued that this hostility was not enough to
disempower the legal advocates of reproductive rights. Instead, their challenge resulted in
part from the legal strategy they decided to take. In Webster, the pro-choice side could
have benefited from gauging Justice O’Connor’s position much more than it did. It was
her approval and advocacy of the undue burden standard that lead to the constitutional
gutting of a right to an abortion post Webster. In Webster, pro-choice litigants “used amici
in much of the same way” it had in previous cases “to bring attention to the Court’s
different perspectives on abortion and to fill in medical, psychological, policy, and
women’s interests gaps left open in their essentially legalistic efforts.”90 Legal scholars
Epstein and Kobylka argue that “Herein, through, lies the problem: given the obvious
changes in the political and legal environments…pro-choice arguments and strategies
should have changed as well.” 91 The reproductive rights movement was not oblivious to
their loss and failure of strategy. Within the movement, advocates were hard at work rethinking the best way to defend a right to an abortion and women’s rights in general.
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At this point, however, I do not want to downplay the hostility that was rampant
then and still today towards a woman’s right to an abortion and all the societal
implications that right has. As one feminist legal scholar reiterated:
“As Justice Blackmun warned in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the
new majority on the Supreme Court is chillingly hostile to ceding this power, for
its denial is a cornerstone of patriarchal power whether expressed in the
enslavement of African-American people, the reproductive servitude of women,
or the denial to gays and lesbians of the right to love. Given the need to stave off
further erosion in the Supreme Court as well as to secure these fundamental rights
in Congress and state courts and legislatures throughout the country, it is
important that we understand the limitations of these rights heretofore recognized
by the Court, in this case the right to privacy.” 92

Feminist critique pushes my analysis here to decipher the privacy and equality argument,
keeping in mind that privacy has been used as a “cornerstone of patriarchal power” in the
Court thus far. The gap in the rhetoric between fetal rights and a woman-centered
approach to abortion is synonymous with upholding patriarchal power versus dismantling
it. Justice Blackmun stated in Webster that “The simple truth is that Roe no longer
survives…I rue the violence that has been done to the liberty and the equality of women.
I rue the violence that has been done to the liberty and equality of women. I rue the
violence that has been done to our legal fabric and to the integrity of this Court.”93 There
was no commitment to a robust concept of equality for women in the decisions the
Courts, both State and Federal, on the rulings on abortion. But this was due to the fact
that the legal framing of abortion was not founded on a commitment to female autonomy,
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but on a commitment to resisting arbitrary state intervention in personal life. There was
room for interpretation to focus on women’s societal limitations in connection to
abortion, but the fetal rights framework has won out regardless of these efforts.

D. Re-Emergence of an Equality Argument
————————————————————————————————————
Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) was a moment in which the Court was
persuaded fiercely to honor the gender equality argument inherent in the right to an
abortion that had been cast aside in the previous decisions of the Court.94 Casey was an
attempt to legitimize to the Court that a woman’s affirmative control and protection of her
own right to her body was key for women’s equality. In her oral argument to the Court,
Kathryn Kolbert stated:
“Since this Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, a generation of American women
have come of age secure in the knowledge that the Constitution provides the
highest level of protection for their child-bearing decisions. This landmark
decision, which necessarily and logically flows from a century of this Court's
jurisprudence, not only protects rights of bodily integrity and autonomy, but
has enabled millions of women to participate fully and equally in
society...Government may not chip away at fundamental rights, nor make them
selectively available only to the most privileged women.” 95

Kolbert linked equality with privacy for women in her oral argument for Casey. Her
argument that upholding Roe was not important for the sanctity of married life, but
essential for women to be full individuals freed from state imposed gendered limitations,
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echoed Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s argument to the Court that such legalized stereotypes
towards women amounted to discrimination. Kolbert additionally pointed out the flaw in
Harris to construe abortion as a hands-off right that only created more inequality among
women themselves, arguing that the State cannot make rights “selectively available only
to the most privileged women.” The Casey decision was contentious in that it had a
contradictory logic. Casey was stuck in the “double edged sword” of privacy that
emerged after Webster. Rhonda Copelon, a reproductive rights activist, wrote after
Webster that “There has emerged a sharp tension between two notions of privacy: the
liberal idea of privacy as the negative and qualified right to be left alone...and the more
radical ideal of privacy as the positive liberty of self-determination and an aspect of equal
personhood. Both practically and theoretically, the privacy doctrine is double-edged,
having within it the tendency to constrain as well as to expand reproductive rights.”96 The
two sides of privacy, positive and negative, were two very different arguments to be made
to the Court. One was about sexual liberation for those traditionally oppressed by social
institutions, such as women and queer people, and the other was about protecting the
right to be left alone. Both arguments would materialize to mean very different realities
for how we understand autonomy in this country. In Casey, Kolbert tried to push the
Court towards recognizing the more positive notes of privacy. It is important to note how
much was against this argument. The “tyranny of absolutes” gave litigators something to
hold onto in a hostile Court and political environment. But Casey showed that holding on
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to off-beat arguments, even to appease the Court’s way of thinking, would not lead to
material equality for women.
By continuing the privacy logic already established with the Court, Casey was a
convoluted victory and defeat for abortion rights. On one hand, Casey reaffirmed Roe and
its central holding. The Court echoed Kolbert’s argument when they acknowledged
personal choice: “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code.”97 With these words, Justice O’Connor placed privacy and personal liberty
above any prescriptions of morality. However, the newly articulated undue burden
standard to justify the state’s control over the female access to abortion services created a
sliding scale that pushed the State closer and closer to controlling a women’s ability to
make free reproductive decisions. The Court explained that the new standard will focus
on the viability of the fetus. The majority opinion declared that:
“Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy
before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from taking
steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even in the
earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to
encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great
weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full
term, and that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted
children as well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to
raise the child herself.”

On this premise, the Justices revisited the trimester framework and concluded that “the
trimester framework suffers from these basic flaws: in its formulation, it misconceives the
nature of the pregnant woman's interest; and in practice, it undervalues the State's interest
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in potential life, as recognized in Roe.” From this, they adopted Justice O’Connor’s
previously articulated “undue burden” standard. Essentially, the majority explained,
“a finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is
invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a
statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid
state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its
legitimate ends.”
The Court protected the state’s interest in potential life and in doing so, gave states a tool
to further restrict the “zone” of privacy women had around their bodies. The undue
burden standard was lenient enough to justify regulations such as 24-hour waiting periods
and mandatory counseling as an effort to “inform the woman’s free choice”. The Court
has revisited exactly how much a women’s privacy protected her right to an abortion, and
almost every case the protection encompasses less and less. Yet, in some ways, Casey
was a positive decision in that it reaffirmed Roe, though the integrity of the holding of
Roe being about women’s rights was slipping away. Justice Harry Blackmun recognized
this loss at the time of Casey and wrote in his partial concurrence that,
“a State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy also
implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality. State restrictions on
abortion compel women to continue pregnancies they otherwise might terminate.
By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts women's
bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the
pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care.”
Essentially, the Court’s development of privacy ignored the impact on womens potential
entry into the public sphere, instead burdening women with their private duties as child
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bearers. Laws regarding women’s reproductive health viewed the continuation of
pregnancy as the default for women and any other decision did not receive as much
support or institutionalized protection or normalcy. Casey was a moment when it seemed
as though at this point in the Courts development, all of the lines towards an equality
argument were there for reproductive freedom. It just needed to be linked together, but
the link was not recognized by the Court or the litigants.
Many feminist legal scholars have outlined the downsides the privacy argument
can have for the position of women in society. The privacy argument has been used to
maintain the status quo, or the subordination of women, through a protection of the
private/domestic sphere. These critiques on privacy have centered on the implementation
of a negative framework of privacy.98 The feminist critique is that this hands-off approach
to government does not account for the fact that “choice cannot be fully free” when we
live “in a world riddled by racism, sexism, homophobia, poverty, and exploitation.”99
This concept of privacy does not account for the coded hierarchies in society that put
bodily autonomy in reach for some women and out of reach for others. Further, the
current utilized concept of privacy does not account for the fact that this distribution is
systematic and cannot be solved on an individual basis. In short, there are very real
material effects to the Court’s decisions on the value of women’s lives.
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Post-Roe and beginning with Harris, the constitutional retrenchment on a right to
an abortion has systematically disadvantaged some women over others. In Harris, the
Court ruled that state funding for abortion was not required. Because of this, the state can
actively
“chose to favor the fetus over the woman…the consequences for women’s access
is profound. Hospitals are used by women who often have no alternative: poorer
women, women of color, rural women, as well as women needing late abortions.
Excluding abortions from any hospital with a public connection will marginalize
the practice of abortion, and threatens to remove it from the curriculum of medical
schools which conduct their training in hospitals tangentially related to the
state.”100
Webster and Casey reiterated this logic and remains the leading dynamic. This logic and
limitation of a right to an abortion brings us to where we are now. Targeted Regulations
of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws are introduced every year and in every state. In
2016, nearly 400 anti-abortion bills were passed.101 Although each bill has a different
method of limitation they all try to accomplish the same goal: to materially eliminate
access to an abortion.
There have been two recent reproductive rights cases since 2012 that confirm the
fears many reproductive rights advocates had post Casey—the constitutional right to an
abortion is vulnerable to severe limitation. Although not dealing directly with the right to
an abortion nor the equality or privacy doctrine, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) is
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important to mention here.102 The case involved a closely held for-profit corporation
owned by a Mennonite family who believed that some contraception covered by the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) was equivalent to an abortion. Because of this, they wished
to opt-out of the contraception mandate of the ACA for their female employees as they
believed this coverage violated their First Amendment rights as well as the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Again, the Court was asked to investigate if the belief
that life begins at conception constitutes a compelling state interest to interfere with
women’s bodily autonomy. The Court ruled in the favor of the Hahn Family and thus, the
precedent was set that religious rights of employees trumps a women’s material ability to
control her reproductive life.
Important in this case was Justice Ginsburg’s thirty five page dissent that she read
from the bench. The argument Justice Ginsburg makes in her dissent is an appeal to
women’s autonomy, and how this decision severely violates any concept of female
individual autonomy. To begin her dissent, Justice Ginsburg drew attention to powerful
words that the Court has previously regarded as law, that “The ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by
their ability to control their reproductive lives.” 103 This quote speaks directly to the
female employee’s autonomy over her body and her health. To advance this claim even
further into the relevant facts of the case at hand, Justice Ginsburg traced the logic behind
the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). She began with Senator
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Barbara Mikulski, who introduced the Women’s Health Amendment (WHA), which
integrated women’s preventative health care services into the ACA. For this part of her
argument, Justice Ginsburg cited senators who were involved in the passage of the WHA
and different medical research groups that gave empirical evidence to the senators, such
as a report from the Institute of Medicine (IOM). Once she illustrated the rationale behind
why the Senators who drafted the ACA included women’s health concerns, Justice
Ginsburg moved on to show that the application of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) by the Court severely deprives women of the autonomy over her body that
the ACA was very intentionally supposed to support.
Justice Ginsburg used amicus briefs to support her women’s autonomy argument.
In the relevant facts of the case, the Justice had ample medical research to back up her
claim on the specific importance of the kind of contraception to which the Hanhs
objected to. Research groups such as the Guttmacher Institute have done extensive
investigation into measuring the social, economic, and political effects of women’s
reproductive health. Their amicus brief supports the Court with thousands of examples of
how female health directly affects their ability to be equal citizens in our communities.
But while the Guttmacher Institute investigates the material effects of comprehensive
reproductive rights, it cannot change laws. Justice Ginsburg pulls this medical discourse
into her legal analysis, giving medical research on women’s health a legitimate stake in
legal decisions. In addition to the Guttmacher Institute, Justice Ginsburg cites the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Ovarian Cancer National
Alliance, and the National Health Law Program. While all of these briefs have slightly
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different angles of analysis, they all bolster Justice Ginsburg’s autonomy argument in a
very similar way—they provide empirical medical, economic, and ethical research
evidence that supports the role contraception plays in women’s lives.
Legal scholars have documented the social movement’s reaction to this dissent,
recognizing that Justice Ginsburg was trying to put the female’s individual rights front
and center to the Court and its considerations.104 This effort was seen again two years
later in a case dealing head-on with abortion regulations.
In 2016, the Supreme Court heard the case of Whole Women’s Health v.
Hellerstedt (2016), in which one such law in Texas was challenged for imposing an
undue burden.105 Planned Parenthood filed a amicus brief that extensively outlined the
impact shutting down clinics that didn't meet hospital standards would have on all Texas
women. Means to travel, the flexibility of a work schedule, childcare arrangements, and
overnight stay arrangements all directly burden women without the resources for these
accommodations.106 Justice Ginsburg directed her questions at oral arguments towards
the application of the undue burden standard. The Justice managed to direct counsel to
showcase how this law was not only an “undue burden” on Texas women, but also played
no role to advance their health at all.
Justice Ginsburg asked the first and last questions of the oral arguments. What
was relevant in this case is how the oral arguments and the decision utilized the “undue
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burden” standard and what concepts of equality and privacy they were drawing from.
Justice Ginsburg pushed the Court in a clear direction. She wanted to determine the
material effect the Texas law had on the autonomy of women.
Scott Keller, representing Texas, made the argument that the laws were for the
health of the women. Immediately Justice Ginsburg pointed out the flaw in this argument.
Keller was trying to downplay Justices Kagin, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg’s line of
questioning about how many women lived an appropriate distance from a clinic. The
evidence suggested that the majority of women living in Texas of reproductive age were
located over 200 miles from a clinic, and this would only increase if the law would go up.
However, Keller rebutted this ratio by suggesting that women could always go to a clinic
in New Mexico that was near the border. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Texas has no
jurisdiction over New Mexico’s facilities, so how could they protect the health of women
with this law if the material effect was forcing women to go across state lines for
reproductive health services? This suggested that the law was not advancing any interest
on the women’s behalf, but only placing an undue burden on their ability to access
abortion:
“Justice Ginsburg: That’s—that’s off that you point to the New Mexico facility.
New Mexico doesn’t have any surgical—ASC requirement, and it doesn't have any
admitting requirement.
So if your argument is right, then New Mexico is not an avail way out for Texas because
Texas says to protect our women, we need these things.
But send them off to Mexico—New Mexico— New Mexico where they don’t get it
either. No admitting privileges, no ASC.
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And that’s perfectly all right. Well, if that’s all right for the—the women in the El Paso
area, why isn't it right for the rest of the women in Texas?”107
This line of questioning utilizes the bare minimum of the undue burden standard to show
that this law has a direct negative effect on the health of women, and no beneficial effect.
Texas comes back to say that the standards it imposes will benefit the women who can
access the clinics. But this is not enough for Justice Ginsburg. She urges the Court to
interpret more along a positive right of women to access health care when she interprets
the Casey standard to ask not only if there is a undue burden, but are any women actually
helped by the legislation?

“Justice Ginsburg: May I ask you one question? You earlier in your argument, you were
quoting how many women are within a reasonable range of the clinic. But don’t we know
from Casey that the focus must be on the ones who are burdened and not the ones who
aren't burdened? There— there is— and the district court said this, you know, there is not
a problem for women who have means to travel, that those women will have access to
abortion, anyways. So—in Texas or out of Texas.
So Casey is quite precise in this, when it’s talking about husbands and notifications. You
don't look to all the women who are getting abortions. You look only to the—to the— the
women from who this is a problem And so the only women we would be looking at is not
all of the women who are—who live in Austin or in Dallas, but the women who have the
problem who don't live near a clinic.
Mr. Keller: Well—
Justice Ginsburg: Isn't that the clear message of Casey…But this is about—what its about
is that a women has a fundamental right to make this choice for herself. Thats what we
sought as the starting premise. And then this is certainly about—Casey—Casey made that
plain, that it—the focus is not he women, and it has to the on the segment of women who
are affected.”108
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Justice Sotomayor makes this point as well in the beginning of oral argument that Justice
Ginsburg expanded on with her questions about the mileage and the intention behind the
Casey standard and how it was interpreted by Texas:
“Justice Sotomayor: I’m not talking about the doctrine. I’m talking about the question I
asked, which is, according to you, the slightest health improvement is enough to impose
on hundreds of through sands of women—-even assuming I accept your argument, which
I don’t, necessarily, because it’s being challenged—but the slightest benefit it enough to
burden the lives of a million women. That’s your point?”109

Subsequently, the lines of questioning were intended to focus on the women and
not only the burden she encounters with this legislation, but the benefit it has on her
autonomy and the “fundamental right to make this choice for herself”, as Ginsburg
emphasized in her last question. The Whole Women’s Health case was a step towards
drawing on a concept of privacy, protected with the undue burden standard, that requires
more from the State. Ginsburg asks the Court to focus on the women who are
disadvantaged to start and how this legislation affects their right to make decision
themselves. Along this line of logic and utility of the privacy doctrine, there could be a
argument made that the state needs to deliver this right by providing more
accommodations to women who are not regarded as the “neutral” under the law. This
would be a positive interpretation of privacy. Texas was treating the subject of the law as
women who can already access abortion, when really the focus should be on the scope of
autonomy guaranteed to all women and making sure it is leveled. This could mean the
state putting more resources towards protecting the autonomy of women under an undue
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burden standard. Indeed the Court did focus on the health of the women in their decision
to outlaw the restrictions on clinics in Texas:
“We have found nothing in Texas’ record evidence that shows that, compared to
prior law (which required a “working arrangement” with a doctor with admitting
privileges), the new law advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting
women’s health. We add that, when directly asked at oral argument whether Texas
knew of a single instance in which the new requirement would have helped even
one woman obtain better treatment, Texas admitted that there was no evidence in
the record of such a case.” 110
By putting female autonomy as the focus of the “undue burden” analysis, Justice
Ginsburg was taking a step towards a positive rights interpretation inherent in privacy.
The positive side of privacy would ask for affirmative protection of female autonomy. In
the context of reproductive rights, this would be more comprehensive and preventive
health care and securement of abortion services. The reality right now is extremely far
from this ideal, but the positive interpretation of a privacy right at least puts female
autonomy as the main issue and perhaps can build a platform to talk about what
protection women need from the state to be equal citizens. Additionally, it can be
observed that a equality argument and positive rights interpretation of privacy asks for
similar affirmative protection. The re-entrenchment of the private sphere and
subordination of women results from the use of a negative concept of either the equality
and privacy right. I will now turn to marriage equality case law to outline the lessons the
reproductive rights movement can learn by using a equality argument as the movement’s
legal basis.
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Chapter 4: Same-Sex Marriage Case Law
————————————————————————————————————
The shared privacy and equality arguments of same-sex marriage and
reproductive rights showcases the limitations of both doctrines for a feminist agenda.
Early feminist legal scholars and activists for reproductive justice called for the unity of
both movements, as they both dealt with themes of gender, sexuality, autonomy, and state
protected sanctity. Mains and Poggi urged for a broader inclusiveness of reproductive
rights after the Casey decision. The activities pointed out that, “Informed by feminism,
reproductive freedom and gay liberation agendas aim for more than the acquisition of
rights. Both movements call for a dismantling of traditional sex roles and for a radical
change in social norms.” 111 Inherent in rights discourse is the criticism that when you
make an inclusionary argument before the Court, it comes with the cost of someone else
being excluded. In law, there cannot in an “in” unless there is an “out”. Women of color
feminism has made this criticism and called for inclusion ever since Simone De Beauvoir
started documenting the oppression of white middle class women as representative of
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every female experience.112 With rights discourse, there is an “othering" of the group that
doesn't get to be included in the new iteration of a call for change. The history of
marriage equality informed the Courts concepts of privacy and equality that has
consequences for the reproductive rights of women making a similar claim for abortion.
The roots of marriage equality can be traced back to the litigation strategies that
first mobilized to get rid of sodomy laws. Sodomy laws date to colonial times as a effort
to protect the sanctity of marriage.113 The first court to ever define sodomy described
certain sexual acts out of marriage as “vile and detestable.”114 In the 1940s, all nontraditional forms of intercourse were criminalized. When the American Law Institute
(ALI) developed the Model Penal Code in the 1970s, its understanding of abortion and
sodomy had a ripple effect on state criminal law statues.115 Embedded in it was a liberal
notion that sodomy and abortion should not be criminalized. While only 14 states
decriminalized abortion, states started dropping sodomy laws rapidly.116 But this was not
of concern for homosexual couples who did not have the protection of marriage to engage
in sexual acts in privacy. In fact, the states that did not adopt the blanket Model Penal
Code explicitly re-wrote their sodomy laws to exclude same-sex couples. So while

Bartkowski, Frances, and Wendy K. Kolmar. “Feminist Theory: A Reader.” McGraw-Hill
Higher Education, 2010.
112

113 Andersen,

Ellen Ann. “Out of the Closets and Into the Courts: Legal Opportunity Structure and
Gay Rights Litigation.” Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2005. Print
114

Prindle v. State (1893)

115 Andersen,
116

Ellen Ann (2005)

Andersen, Ellen Ann (2005)

73

sodomy laws were outdated for straight couples, they remained pertinent for same sex
couples due to legal ideology rooted in morality.
Cases in reproductive rights gave the gay rights movement the legal hook they
needed to bring sodomy laws to the Court. The right to privacy in Griswold was first
articulated as a way to protect marital intimacy in the home. It was this appeal to
intimacy within marriage that gave gay rights activists a way to speak to the Court about
gay men and women’s intimacy that also needed protecting. Griswold provided the hook
to privacy and Carey v. Population Services (1977) explicitly linked privacy, abortion,
and sodomy when Justice Brennan stated that “The Court has not definitely answered the
difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits State statutes
regulating private consensual sexual behavior among adults.”117 Here was an opportunity
to revisit sodomy laws after failures to challenge the state statutes before. The outcomes
of New York’s People v. Onofre (1980) and Texas’s Baker v. Wade (1982) gave gay rights
litigators the opportunity to revisit sodomy reform under both a privacy and equality
argument. Onofre was caught in his home engaging in sexual activity with his younger
male partner. It was Onofre’s private lawyer that tried to protect his client under his right
to privacy and equal protection under the law. While the trial court denied these claims,
the appeals court ruled in Onofre’s favor asserting that his private morality was protected
under the right to privacy and the state did not have compelling interest to intervene. 118
This was the first time a state sodomy law was struck down as applied for same-sex
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sexual acts. To give the litigators even more material, the Court ruled favorably for
sodomy reform two years later. Baker, a teacher described as a “model citizen” but for his
sexual orientation, also advocated for both his privacy and equality. The U.S. District
Court agreed with Baker’s case and drew the same comparison as Justice Brennan did
between contraceptive use and sexual acts. The Court ruled that “the right of two
individuals to choose what type of sexual conduct they will enjoy in private is just as
personal, just as important, just as sensitive—indeed, even more so—than the decision by
the same couples to engage in sex using a contraceptive to prevent unwanted
pregnancy.” 119 While this ruling was not representative of all, it is a good example of
when gay rights litigators benefited from the legal precedent previously established by
the reproductive rights movement.
The legal precedent, while not well established, was there for litigators to make
both a privacy and equal protection argument against sodomy laws. Litigators debated
about which argument to rest their case on and eventually went with the privacy
argument—Hardwick was arrested in his own bedroom and no situation seemed more
compelling as that to rest a privacy argument on. However, the plan failed as the Court
viewed the privacy argument to exist in notions of family, marriage, and procreation
rather than more individual notions of privacy. Thus, they ruled that there was no
protected right for same-sex sexual activity. Gay men and women, as well as pro-abortion
arguments, were seen as destroying the “social fabric” by attempting to disrupt the
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“maternal destiny” of women. 120 It would take convincing the Court that gay couples
were deserving of state legitimacy to protect sexual intimacy for homosexuals. This
strategy would exclude single gay men and women, or couples uninterested, unable, or
unwilling to assimilate to the traditional “social fabric” marriage provided.
While the 1980s seemed bleak for both movements, the separate struggles of each
showed the emerging strength within the gay rights movement. While this is a
comparative legal history, it is important to note what was occurring in the political
climate of the time period.121 While reproductive rights were under attack by the New
Right, “not a single state decriminalized sodomy in response to Bowers.” 122 Meanwhile,
abortion was made a wedge issue in the 1980 election and States were introducing, and
still do, introduce an overwhelming amount of anti-abortion laws.123During the reign of
the New Rights, feminist scholars again linked abortion rights with gay rights:
“In both the propaganda and policies of the Right, hostility to women’s autonomy
is the unifying link between opposition to abortion and opposition to other
feminist goals. Abortion rights are central to and have come to symbolize
women’s control. The Right opposes that control in the broadest sense. That is
why they oppose sex education, government-funded contraception and family
planning clinics, gay rights… But their fight against abortion is the most virulent,
and they have made real gains.”124
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The Court had to keep on revising exactly how much a woman’s privacy protected her
right to an abortion, and in almost every case the protection encompassed less and less.
While the blanket ruling of Roe created a ceiling for reproductive rights, it has also
established a very conservative way of speaking about abortion rights that had more to do
with the debate over the beginning of life and less to do with female autonomy. While the
fight for abortion was in legal retreat, gay marriage litigators had the opportunity after
Bowers to change the direction of their litigation.125 A state-based strategy was a viable
option for gay-rights advocates. The U.S. District Court’s ruling in Baker was starkly
different than the more dismissive ruling The Supreme Court made in Bowers. This was
an indicator that the state constitution might be more inclusive to the rights of same-sex
couples. Further, if the laws were litigated in state court, they would never reach the then
hostile Supreme Court.126
Gay rights litigators from the ACLU and Lambda enacted this state-based
litigation strategy after Hardwick. Each case challenged a sodomy law through a privacy
argument. If the State’s law only referred to same-sex acts, then the lawyers would bring
an equality argument as well. There was not uniform success, but from 1992 to 2003,
nine States struck down sodomy laws. By the time the Court heard Lawrence v. Texas
(2002), the strategy of the litigators had changed. This time, the lawyers were bringing
both a federal and a state claim, thus getting ready to go to The Supreme Court with
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sodomy reform again. Some scholars deemed Lambdas efforts towards sodomy reform
and marriage equality a success after the introduction of the equal protection argument.
Lawrence overturned Bowers “in sweeping terms that recognized the dignity and worth
of lgb people.”127 What can be observed was that after litigants utilized equal protection
within the Court, they started winning cases.
After litigants for same-sex marriage adopted a equality argument, their
movement succeed much more than the reproductive rights movement that was under
privacy. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in Lawrence stating that Texas’s moral
dislike of gays “is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy a rational basis review under
the Equal Protection Clause.”128 From here, Lambda won the case and established
precedent in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) on an equal protection argument. The same year,
GLAD won its first marriage equality case in Massachusetts by only using a equal
protection argument in Good Ridge v. Department of Public Health (2003).129 The
strength in the Equal Protection argument under a moral theme originated in the
jurisprudence of reproductive rights. The privacy argument appeased the morality of
normative sexual encounters, just as the equal protection argument for same-sex marriage
appeased the traditional ideology in marriage. But just as privacy failed to secure
women’s autonomy in the face of anti-abortion legislation, so will equality. For gay
rights, dealing with similar restrictions on sexuality, an Equal Protection argument based
in the institution of marriage holds more legal ground when faced with disapproval from
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judges. Yet if equality doctrine is adopted in this same logic by the reproductive rights
movement, no real gains will be made towards sustaining an ideal of autonomy for
women that is comparable to mens. I argue that this is because the concept of marriage
that was used to inform the courts understanding of equality was an extension of the same
private/public sphere logic that is ill suited to adequately provide women with the
tangible rights necessary for full autonomy over their lives.

A. Marriage as a Heteronormative Institution and the Construction of Female
Autonomy
————————————————————————————————————
Gay rights and the surrounding scholarship on sexuality is much more than a
focus on marriage. What started as a break from feminism, queer theory was suppose to
challenge everything normative.130 This certainly included the institution of marriage,
which had been well interpreted by feminists as a tool of “‘cultural regulation’ and is not
only a ‘vehicle for public policy’ but the vehicle by which the state shapes the public
order into a ‘gendered order.’”131 Cott, Pateman, and Brown all established a critique of
the institution of marriage as the states tool to keep the maternal role of women as the
status quo. When marriage equality became the agenda for the gay rights movement, it
Jagose, Annamarie. "Feminism's Queer Theory." Feminism & Psychology 19.2 (2009):
157-174.
130

131

Brandzel, Amy L. "Queering citizenship? Same-sex marriage and the state." GLQ: A Journal
of Lesbian and Gay Studies 11.2 (2005): 171-204.; Nancy F. Cott, “Giving Character to Our
Whole Civil Polity: Marriage and the Public Order in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in U.S.
History as Women’s History: New Feminist Essays, ed. Linda K. Kerber, Alice Kessler-Harris,
and Kathryn Kish
Sklar (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 107–21.

79

seemed almost counterintuitive for many activists. Throughout the legal and cultural fight
for marriage equality, many notions of what equality is informed what a social movement
was trying to make a singular discourse. Linking equality to the institution of marriage
constructed not only what marriage was before the Court, but what notions of individual
equality and privacy meant as well.
In Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Court explicitly relied on the
respectability of marriage to ground their rationale that same-sex couples should be
allowed to enjoy this institution too. The Court decided that same-sex couples advocating
for a right to marry “do not want marriage abolished. They do not attack the binary nature
of marriage…” and thus there is no reason why they are denied to enjoy its protection.
The Court ruled:
“Without question, civil marriage enhances the ‘welfare of the community.’ It is a
‘social institution of the highest importance.’…Civil marriage anchors an ordered
society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones. It is central to the
way the Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for the orderly
distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and
supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds…” 132
This excerpt clearly shows the assumptions about the “binary nature of marriage” and the
roles individuals play to maintain this social order that will only prevail if gay people are
allowed into the institution of marriage. In a liberal political tradition, marriage provides
the bedrock for competitiveness that continues the production of society. While the civil
sphere is nasty towards citizens, marriage and its feminized and privatized nature sustains
safety and wellbeing for citizens. Protection is derived from the private sphere, yet it
cannot survive without a maternal figure in it.
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Gay marriage sustaining the “binary nature” of marriage is important because it
informs what protections the maternal figure receives as an individual. Indeed, many
queer critiques have come out against marriage equality, pointing out the extremely
exclusionary nature of its rights discourse and thereby illegitimacy of any other forms of
intimacy that are not binary.133 However, these critiques focus mostly on the economic
side of the marriage argument and the effects neoliberalism has to freedom. Brandzel
points out that “While it is true that same-sex-marriage advocates have critiqued the
male/female and homosexual/heterosexual binaries latent in marriage, they have not
attempted to undermine the sanctity of the domestic couple.”134 Yet while all of these
critiques are important to the social movement, it has yet to inform the Courts rhetoric in
its utility of the equality argument for marriage. For female individual rights, there are
consequences of using the equality argument when this is its bedrock. Same-sex marriage
discourse has informed the jurisprudence and thus the assumed status quo we live in. A
status-quo that subordinates the feminine and disallows for women to be authors in their
life. Married or not, white or not, straight or not, women are limited in their fluidity
between the public and private. The feminine construction of individual autonomy
derives from a logic that places deserving citizens as mothers in the home. While privacy
is found behind closed doors of some assimilated married couples, it has not extended to
women of all situations looking to make decisions about their bodies that yields the most
integrity for them.
Conrad, Ryan, ed. “Against Equality: Queer Critiques of Gay Marriage.” Against Equality
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VI: Conclusion
————————————————————————————————————
I write as an advocate for women and reproductive rights. What is the best
constitutional basis for women’s equality? To answer this question, I began by defining
what I mean when I say equality. Given its many definitions and conceptions, I carved
out a definition of gender equality that utilizes both liberal feminism and legal feminist
theory: “every person should have the same freedom to structure his or her life” and you
must apply leveled subjectivity to treat cases similarly in proportion to their differences. I
followed the legal feminist methodology to uncover how the law negates difference to
uphold the male norm. This discussion was critical for me to analyze what women need
for equality in a patriarchy.
My hook into this feminist agenda was the prior research scholars such as Jill
Lepore have started on the usefulness of the equality doctrine for the reproductive rights
movement. Transparently, I began this research with the full intention of setting out to
bolster the equality argument for a feminist agenda. But once I got to applying a feminist
lens to the rhetoric of the Court, I discovered a unsettling yet freeing conclusion: no
doctrine will be the feminist holy grail. It is far more important the arguments that
litigants make and the focus drawn from these arguments that will reap benefits for
women.
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Partly this research has been a discovery of the traps our words can fall into when
we try to push one agenda over another. Gender discrimination case law showed how
pushing for equality without addressing gender difference left reproductive rights under a
much more restrictive protection of privacy. And in same-sex marriage, the use of
equality left us with a re-entrenchment of the private/public dichotomy. A binary that
scholars such as Carole Pateman have shown this dichotomy’s oppressive nature towards
women. I conclude that the pitfall litigants and advocates ran into when utilizing the
equality doctrine previously was a misconception of female autonomy. As stated above,
for gender equality, there must be protected autonomy and leveled subjectivity. Gender
discrimination case law used a “equality as sameness” approach, which resulted in a
misapplication of leveled subjectivity. As seen in the pregnancy discrimination case law,
women were left in the trap of having to prove their similarity to men as a prerequisite for
equal treatment. Pregnant women were not able to do this due to the blatant exposure of
their reproductive abilities, and thus received inadequate protection for being pregnant in
the work place. The legal fight for same-sex marriage also utilized an equality argument
that relied on the image of the feminine remaining in the private sphere. Both of these
histories have contributed to a concept of female autonomy that does not result in gender
equality.
In the recent arguments made by Justice Ginsburg in Hobby Lobby and
Hellerstedt, there is a logical treatment of female autonomy that if followed, would
deliver a robust delivery of women’s equality. Currently, the reproductive rights
movement is limited in the arguments it can make due to its roots in the privacy doctrine.
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Thus, we must be very trepidacious in every argument inside and outside the Court. I
have documented how the privacy doctrine has been criticized by feminists as being
inherently oppressive to women and the equality doctrine has also contributed to female
oppression through its negative right interpretation. However, there has been moments of
genuine delivery and activism towards gender equality in both of these doctrines
histories. Katheryn Kolbert’s oral argument to the Court in Casey relied on rhetoric in
Griswold that recognized that a woman cannot be truly equal in society without full
control over her reproductive health life. Casey asked the Court to determine how
abortion restrictions explicitly take away female autonomy over her own body and
reproductive decisions. Casey resulted in the undue burden standard, which subsequently
turned the abortion debate to be more focused on the protection of fetal life, rather than
women’s autonomy. But in Hellerdest, Justice Ginsburg applied the undue burden
standard in a new light. Instead of asking if the abortion restriction limits women, the
Justice asked how it explicitly helps women. Our basis of review should strive for a
affirmative protection of women, not just a limiting harm to them. This logic utilizes a
positive concept and affirmative protection of female autonomy.
I argue for a legal path forward that is not tied to any one doctrine as a source of
gender equality and substantive reproductive rights. The literature, and my own analysis,
leads me to believe that it is far more important to weigh what logic is available within
the Court against the necessary advocacy that must be done for a cause. I believe that the
use of equality and privacy doctrine have worked against the reproductive rights
movement with the hope of speaking the Courts language to itself. The tyranny of
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absolutes, the masculine norm of law, and the perceived threat to the status quo that is
innate in an ask for abortion rights all work against the reproductive rights movement.
Yet, the history has shown me that advocating for women with the goal of a robust
delivery of gender equality is possible, even within these conditions. In an ideal world
with progressive legal, cultural, and political conditions, I envision a very different legal
approach than the one I see as possible right now. I believe that a positive approach to
equality is the highest level of affirmative protection reproductive rights advocates can
work towards in a liberal political system. Demanding contraception coverage, abortion
access, childcare, maternity leave, and welfare programs to accommodate for women's
reproductive capabilities is the most inclusive way to make genuine authorship and
autonomy for women a reality. But we are far from living in this world, and I am aware
of that. Yet I believe that working with that legal basis as the goal can inform the
movements language and legal decisions. If we cannot have positive equality now, that
does not mean we need to continue to work along the logic that has already worked
against the movements goal. Curtailing arguments and doctrine to advance women’s
position, resources, respect, individualism, and autonomy is the way forward. For now, I
have documented what the limitations and strengths of the privacy and equality doctrine
are for the reproductive rights movement. I acknowledge that my analysis has only been
on these limited histories so far, yet I conclude with a freeing notion-doctrine should not
be treated as a linear way of thinking about reproductive rights. Reproductive rights is a
highly variable and dynamic concept, unique and essential for every women’s autonomy.
Such a robust aspect of life, the very continuation of life, should not be restricted to
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limited concepts of any doctrine the Court has developed thus far. Every argument should
work towards creating inclusive precedent, rather than refining the argument to the norms
already prevailing in law and culture. Legally, I believe a positive rights iteration gives
even privacy this possibility- as seen in the work of Justice Ginsburg.
At the beginning of this thesis, I wished to find hope in the synergy between
equality and privacy frameworks that if used together, can give way to a robust concept
of female autonomy that will advance the feminist goal of articulating what gender
equality requires in a patriarchy. I conclude that at all criticisms and successes of privacy
and equality doctrine weave into the suppression and protection of female autonomy. At
the intersection of privacy and equality positive rights, there is a robust concept of
autonomy that would free women from the private sphere and allow for a dismantling of
the private/public gendering that works to limit femininity.
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